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CLD-373        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-2304 
 ___________ 
 
 CLEVELAND HOWARD, 
   Appellant 
 v. 
 
ARCHIE B. LONGLEY, WARDEN 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-00037) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 8, 2013 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 27, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Cleveland Howard seeks review of the District Court’s denial of 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because the 
appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
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 Howard is a federal inmate, who filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that the 
Federal  Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) erred in computing his sentence.  The relevant facts 
are not in dispute.  Howard was arrested in 2004 on state charges related to a robbery 
committed in Cincinnati.  He was sentenced to three years in prison in January 2005.  In 
October 2005, Howard pleaded guilty to federal conspiracy and firearm charges.  One 
conspiracy charge related to the Cincinnati robbery; the remaining conspiracy charges 
related to other robberies.  The plea agreement provided that Howard would receive a 
sentence of seventeen years in prison. 
 On January 11, 2006, Howard was sentenced to a seventeen-year term in federal 
prison.  At the hearing, defense counsel asked if the federal sentence would run 
concurrently with the state sentence.  After ascertaining that Howard had about eleven 
months left on his state sentence, the District Judge replied that the sentences would run 
concurrently and that the remaining eleven months would thus count toward Howard’s 
federal sentence.  The subsequent order reflected this decision by recommending to the 
BOP that a portion of Howard’s sentence be served concurrently with his state sentence.  
Howard, who was appearing in federal court subject to a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum, was returned to state custody.  He remained there until he was released to 
serve his federal sentence on December 12, 2006.  The BOP determined that Howard’s 
federal sentence commenced on the day it was imposed, January 11, 2006.  The BOP 
gave him one day of prior custody credit and fifty-seven days of credit pursuant to Willis 
v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971).  According to the BOP, Howard has a 
projected release date of September 5, 2020. 
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 After challenging the computation of his sentence with the BOP, Howard filed a  
habeas corpus petition claiming that all time served on his state sentence should have 
counted against his federal sentence.  The District Court denied the petition, concluding 
that Howard’s sentence was correctly computed.  After the District Court denied his 
motion for reconsideration,
1
 Howard appealed. 
 Howard’s challenge to the BOP’s computation of his sentence is properly brought 
in a § 2241 petition.  See United States v. Grimes, 641 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1981).  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review over the denial of 
the  petition.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  The BOP is 
responsible for computing a federal prisoner’s period of incarceration under applicable 
federal law.  See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992).  In calculating 
the sentence, the BOP determines (1) when the federal sentence commenced, and (2) 
whether there are any credits to which the prisoner may be entitled.   See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3585. 
 In this case, the BOP correctly determined that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a),  
Howard’s sentence commenced on January 11, 2006, the date it was imposed.  In making 
this determination, the BOP relied on guidelines that direct that the sentence for an 
inmate begins on the day it was imposed when the inmate, like Howard, (1) is in the 
primary custody of the state when his federal sentence is imposed, and (2) the court 
                                                 
1
 Howard sought reconsideration on the basis that the District Court might not have considered 
his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.  The court denied 
reconsideration because it had considered his objections, as reflected in the order denying the 
petition. 
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orders the sentence to run concurrently with the state sentence.  See Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, Program Statement 5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual 1-13, 1-32A-33 
(1999).  This is the earliest possible date that Howard’s sentence could have commenced 
because a sentence cannot start earlier than the day it was imposed.  Id. at 1-13; see also 
United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] federal sentence cannot 
commence prior to the date it is pronounced, even if made concurrent with a sentence 
already being served.”)  Howard nonetheless argues that his federal sentence should have 
commenced before it was imposed – at the start of his state sentence – relying on Barden 
v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1990).  Barden is of no help, however, because it 
involved the opposite sentencing situation:  i.e., Barden’s federal sentence was imposed 
before his state sentence.  Id. at 478.  Barden thus did not involve the question of whether 
a federal sentence could commence before it was imposed.  The simple fact here is that  
Howard received what the sentencing court recommended:  the approximately eleven  
months remaining on his state sentence also counted against his federal sentence because 
the BOP ran his sentence concurrently with the state sentence from the day the federal 
sentence was imposed.
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 Howard also argues that the sentencing court erred by not applying § 5G1.3 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines to adjust his sentence for all time served on the state 
sentence.  The District Court concluded that Howard could not bring the claim in a 
                                                 
2
 Although Howard does not challenge the BOP’s computation of credits against his sentence, 
we note that he cannot receive credit for the time served on his state sentence prior to the 
commencement of his federal sentence because 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(2) does not allow an inmate 
to receive such double credit.  See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337. 
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§ 2241 petition.  We agree.  A challenge under the Sentencing Guidelines goes to the 
validity of a sentence, rather than the execution of a sentence, and is thus inappropriate 
for a § 2241 petition.  See United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Howard could have presented this challenge in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and he 
has not met the criteria for demonstrating that the remedy provided by § 2255 is 
inadequate or ineffective.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997). 
   For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders denying 
Howard’s habeas corpus petition and his motion for reconsideration.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
